The Past as Present has come to be known as the "usable past"-quite problematic. Indeed, which of the recent Russian pasts one is to choose as a resource as these pasts seem to be so radically different? Second, alongside Russia's political instability there is, paradoxically, a striking picture of geopolitical stability, meaning Russia's quite remarkable longevity as a geopolitical entity. At least since the beginning of the 18th century, "Russia" has been a permanent geopolitical fixture on Europe's north-eastern margins with its persistent pretence to the status of a great (European) power.2
But whatever Russia's "special features," the relationship of its history to its present and future is not principally different from that of other countries. Russia's current policies (both domestic and foreign) are certainly made under the influence of the past. As Marx famously put it, people act not "under selfselected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past."3 But he opened this important paragraph by forcefully stating that "[M]en make their own history," which is very true-they make it while pursuing their specific interests, weighing up various options and facing multiple alternatives.
Against this backdrop, I intend to investigate what kind of link there is between Russia's foreign policy and what is nowadays called the "memory politics" or the "politics of history." I will start off by briefly looking into the issue of the specifics of the Russian governing elites' understanding of the importance of the past. The discussion of Russia's deployment of history politics within a broader framework of its foreign policy will follow. The analysis of the crucial link between history politics and Russia's (international) identity will come next. I will conclude by summing up the key arguments advanced in this study.
My main thesis is that post-Soviet Russia, like many other countries, does instrumentalize history to achieve certain political objectives, including in the sphere of international relations. However, Russia's wariness of any political philosophy, its reluctance to be associated with any clearly defined ideological position, and its intention to avoid meaningful ideological debates compel it to opt for the kind of history politics that is characterized by a high degree of ambivalence.
